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Not many people understand where laws began but many times it’s important to know this to help you better understand the law itself. This is also true with the California Lemon Law.

This law started in 1979 by a woman in Lemon Grove, California. She purchased a car and while waiting it to be repaired she lost her patience. Considering that 3 months had gone by, you can understand why. All by herself, she picketed that exact dealership for a whole 5 months. During that time she was verbally abused by the mechanics, salesman and customers. Finally after all this time she got some attention from the local newspaper. A citizen’s movement began, support for her situation built and it resulted in the California Lemon Law being enacted.

This humble beginning spawned a lemon law in every single state. Of course the law varies from state to state but they pretty much all say the same thing; that the vehicle must be in good condition, without malfunctions when it was sold and throughout the life of the warranty.

California, like most other states, states that after a reasonable number of attempts to repair the vehicle by the dealership, if the vehicle still isn’t fixed, then it can be considered a lemon. The only exception to that rule is if the malfunction could cause bodily harm or even death. If that’s the case, then it can be just one attempt to repair it and if it isn’t fixed, it can be considered a lemon and the vehicle will quality under this law.

The most important aspect of this law is regarding the warranty. It doesn’t matter if the car is one month old or two years old. If the vehicle is still under warranty, then you can qualify for this law. Also, don’t forget that this law doesn’t just cover automobiles. It also covers: trucks, SUVs, vans, boats, recreational vehicles and motorcycles. The same thing applies to all the vehicles except for the last three. They have several specifications that must be in order before they can qualify.

Many times when you purchase a vehicle, the dealership will say that it is being sold “as is.” If you bought a vehicle like that, it still can qualify. Saying “as is” does not exempt that vehicle from being considered a lemon. You still can go forward, get yourself a good “lemon law” attorney and get your money back or a new replacement vehicle.

Remember, when you look for an attorney, find one that will give you a free case evaluation to see if your vehicle qualifies. Also, find one that will not make you spend any out of pocket expenses. What they usually do is work on your case and they take a percentage of any of the money that they recover for you.

Allen Walters is a consumer who has dealt with the Lemon Law. Through interactions with a Los Angeles Lemon Law attorney, he has learned how to navigate through the difficult task of taking on the powerful Automobile Industry.

The new ACAS Code of Practice replaces the statutory dismissal, disciplinary and grievance procedures from 6th April 2009. Set out below is a summary of the changes.

Removal of the Statutory Dismissal, Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures.

The much controversial statutory dismissal and disciplinary procedure (SDDP) and statutory grievance procedures (SGP) will be abolished and replaced with a new regime on 6th April 2009.

Who is Affected?

All employers, no matter the size of the organisation will be affected. The new ACAS Code of Practice (Code) is intended to provide the basic requirements of fairness and reasonable behaviour in most instances. The Code will apply to all employees (not workers or agency workers unless agreed by the employer) and if not followed will expose the employer to potentially successful claims brought in the Employment Tribunal.

What are the Changes?

1) The Code applies to all formal disciplinary procedures and unlike the SDDP not just dismissals, demotions or suspension without pay. Management must therefore be familiar with and follow the Code before implementing any disciplinary action including (but not limited to) dismissals, written warnings and final written warnings.

2) Unlike the SDDP failure to follow the Code will not result in a dismissal being automatically unfair. However, if the employer did not follow the Code the employee is likely to be successful in a claim for unfair dismissal and the Employment Tribunal will have power to increase any compensation awarded by up to 25 percent.

3) The Code does not apply to redundancy dismissals or non-renewal of fixed term contracts. However, it is advisable to follow the principles in the Code to minimise successful Employment Tribunal claims and to ensure fairness for the employee.

4) The Code also applies to grievances raised by the employee and sets out the procedure to follow when a grievance is raised. Under the SGP employees were unable to bring a claim in the Employment Tribunal until a grievance had been raised. This formal requirement has been removed enabling the employee to bring a claim in the Employment Tribunal without first having raised a grievance. However, a failure to raise a grievance pursuant to the Code may adversely affect the success of or compensation awarded in any subsequent Employment Tribunal litigation.

5) Whereas an employer had an obligation to investigate a grievance under the SGP raised by an employee who had left employment this is no longer the case. However, dependant on the nature of the complaint raised employers should consider whether it should investigate to minimise Employment Tribunal claims.

Summary of the Code

A. Disciplinary Matters.

1) Investigate to establish the facts of each case.

2) Inform the employee in writing of the allegations raised against them.

3) Provide the employee with advance notice of any witnesses the employer intends to call.

4) Hold a meeting an allow the employee to be accompanied by a companion (Trade Union Representative or colleague) and allow the employee to state his or her case, call their own witnesses and raise points about the employer’s witnesses.

5) Decide which action is fair and appropriate and inform the employee in writing.

6) Provide a right of appeal.

B. Grievances.

1) The employee should inform the employer the nature of the grievance if it is not possible to resolve informally.

2) A meeting should be held to discuss the grievance and the employee has a right to bring a companion (as above) to the meeting.

3) The employer must decide which action is fair and appropriate and inform the employee in writing.

4) If not resolved the employer should allow the employee to take the grievance further by way of an appeal.

Transitional Procedures

There are transitional procedures in place where grievance and/or disciplinary action occurred entirely before 6th April 2009 or started before 6th April 2009 and continued thereafter.

Chelmsford Solicitors Gepp and Sons are one of the largest and longest established solicitors in Essex offering advice on employment law, as well as a full legal service to business and private clients. www.geppandsons.co.uk.

In 1988, in Newark, New Jersey, Rose Cippollone’s family won the first civil suit victory against a tobacco company in United States history. What the Cippollone family did not realize, however, was that its legal battles were only beginning and that Liggett would fight the verdict to the Supreme Court, and beyond.

The Case
Rose Cippollone was born in New Jersey in 1925 and, like many young people lured by slick tobacco industry advertising, she began smoking at an early age. Although there were medical studies linking smoking to health problems, they were not widely publicized. The U.S. Surgeon General did not begin looking into the issue until 1962 and federal laws requiring warning labels were not passed until 1966. Meanwhile, cigarette companies like Liggett had spent billions of dollars advertising the pleasures of smoking without any mention of the risks.

In 1981, Rose was diagnosed with lung cancer caused by smoking and, in 1983, she sued Liggett, the manufacturer of her favorite brands of cigarettes, Chesterfield and L&M. Although Rose died in 1984, her family continued with the case and it went to trial in 1988.

During the four-month trial, the Cippollones introduced evidence establishing:

- Not only did the tobacco companies not warn of the risk of smoking but, to the contrary, they suggested that cigarette smoking was safe, harmless and had the support of medical doctors.

- Tobacco company documents showed a sophisticated conspiracy to refute, undermine, neutralize, confuse and mislead the public for the purpose of having people continue and start smoking.

- The tobacco companies challenged all evidence of smoking dangers while conducting no research until the 1950s and then set up a bogus Tobacco Institute Research Committee that was highly publicized as the industry’s good faith effort to search for the truth, but never did any legitimate research.

The Verdict
In the first ever verdict against a tobacco company, the jury found Liggett 20% responsible and Rose 80% responsible for her death and awarded $400,000.

Appeal and Surrender
Unfortunately for the Cippollones, the jury’s verdict was not the end of the case. Liggett immediately appealed and the case crawled through the appellate courts, ultimately reaching the United State’s Supreme Court docket in 1991. The central issue on appeal was whether or not federal legislation requiring cigarette warning labels prohibited personal injury lawsuits for failure to warn against the tobacco company. In 1992, the Supreme Court held that the lawsuit was not prohibited, but that certain evidence was improperly admitted during the first trial which required a new trial.

Back to square one, facing the prospects of another lengthy trial against Liggett, the Cippollone family chose to give up rather than retry the case. The lesson was that tobacco companies could be beat, but that it would take a very determined plaintiff to get the job done.

Tim Rayne is the author of numerous publications on Personal Injury Law and is a graduate of the Temple University Beasley School of Law’s Master’s in Trial Advocacy Program. Tim can be reached at http://www.macelree.com/traynelaw.

The case of Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 2008) is the latest in a line of cases addressing what happens in a Personal Injury trial after a jury has awarded no damages for pain and suffering when the evidence clearly established that the defendant caused the accident and the injuries sustained by the plaintiff are of a type that would be reasonably expected to cause pain and suffering. Ultimately, the Superior Court followed prior rulings and held that an award of only past medical expenses was inadequate. Instead, a new trial on damages was required. Nevertheless, there is still authority which allows the courts to affirm zero verdicts under certain circumstances.

New Trial
Generally, an award of zero for pain and suffering with admitted injuries should result in a new trial on damages. The following are relevant cases:

Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 2008)
Plaintiff was rear-ended and treated with a chiropractor and neurologist for cervical, lumbar, bi-lateral shoulder and wrist as well as left elbow strains. When the jury’s verdict was only for the $2,540.92 of unreimbursed medical expenses,
the verdict was reversed as against the clear weight of evidence.

Womack v. Crowley, 877 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. 2005)
Plaintiff was rear-ended and suffered a thoracic strain and a torn meniscus in her left knee. Future surgery projected to cost $6,000.00 was recommended and plaintiff testified regarding pain and suffering. When the jury awarded only $6,000.00, the verdict was overturned as being against the weight of evidence because of no award for pain and suffering.

Marsh v. Hanley, 856 A.2d 138 (Pa. Super. 2004)
In a clear liability case, the plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries which both parties’ experts conceded could take six months to heal. Lost wages were $2,900.00 and so was the jury’s verdict. A new trial on damages was ordered because of no award for pain and suffering.

Burnhauser v. Bumberger, 745 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. 2000)
Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries in a head-on collision. The defense expert conceded that plaintiff suffered injuries, but stated that they should have resolved within six months. An award of $1,257.24 for unreimbursed medical expenses was overturned and a new trial on damages was ordered.

No New Trial
Despite the cases cited above, there is still authority from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that can support a zero verdict for pain and suffering.

Davis v. Mullen, 773 A.2d 764 (Pa. 2001)
Plaintiff’s tractor trailer was hit head on, left the road and turned on its side. Plaintiff treated at the Emergency Room and had pain over the weekend, but then went back to work. He saw a chiropractor twenty days later who treated him for twenty visits, but who testified that he couldn’t say for certain that the injury was related to this accident as opposed to plaintiff’s three prior accidents. The jury awarded only $4,218.44, which covered medical expenses and personal property damages. The court’s holding was that a jury’s award for no pain and suffering can stand where the trial court had a reasonable basis to believe that (1) the jury did not believe that the plaintiff suffered only pain and suffering or (2) that a preexisting condition or injury was the sole cause of the alleged pain and suffering.

Tim Rayne is the author of numerous publications on Personal Injury Law and is a graduate of the Temple University Beasley School of Law’s Master’s in Trial Advocacy Program. Tim can be reached at http://www.macelree.com/traynelaw.

On December 27, 2007, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case of Everhart v. PMA Insurance, 938 A.2d 301 (Pa. 2007), holding that stacking of Uninsured/Underinsured (UM/UIM) coverage is not required by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) in the context of commercial fleet policies.

“Stacking” is a concept under automobile insurance law which multiplies the amount of UM/UIM coverage purchased in a policy by the amount of vehicles insured under the policy. In commercial fleet policies, which often cover many vehicles, stacking would result in substantial coverage. For example, stacking UM/UIM of $50,000 for a 100 vehicle commercial fleet policy would result in available coverage of $5,000,000 ($50,000 x 100 vehicles) for each person injured in an accident.

The question in Everhart was whether Section 1738 of the MVFRL, which was passed in 1990 and made UM/UIM stacking mandatory unless a form waiver was provided by the insurance company and signed by the purchaser of the policy, applied to commercial fleet policies. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that the answer was no, that fleet policies were exempt from Section 1738 and no stacking would apply, despite the fact that no form waivers had been signed.

The Facts

Robert Everhart was the President and CEO of Russell Standard Corporation which had a commercial fleet automobile insurance policy with PMA insuring 33 vehicles. The policy provided liability coverage of $1,000,000 but UM/UIM coverage of only $35,000. PMA did not offer UM/UIM stacking on commercial policies, so no waivers had been executed.

On July 26, 2001, Everhart was driving a Chevy Tahoe covered under Russell Standard’s commercial fleet policy when the Tahoe was struck by another vehicle and Everhart was killed. Everhart’s estate made a claim with PMA alleging that, since no valid UM/UIM waivers were signed as was required by Section 1738 of the MVFRL, stacking automatically applied. The Estate claimed that it was entitled to stacked UIM coverage of $1,155,000 ($35,000 x 33 vehicles = $1,155,000).

The Supreme Court Decision

Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Estate was wrong and that stacking did not apply to a commercial fleet policy. The following were the reasons cited by the Court:

1. The language of Section 1738 provides clues that the Legislature intended to exclude commercial fleet policies. Although Section 1738 states that waivers must be signed or else stacking is mandatory, the waiver forms themselves use language including terms like “I,” “myself” and “member of my household” which indicate that they intend to apply to personal, but not commercial, policies.

2. The primary purpose of the MVFRL is to control the cost of insurance so that more people can afford insurance. Stacking of coverage under commercial policies, potentially covering tens, hundreds or thousands of cars, would lead to very high premium costs.

3. Insurers and commercial policyholders do not expect UM/UIM stacking to apply, such that holding that Section 1738 requires stacking would be unfair.

4. At the time that Section 1738 was enacted, prior court decisions had consistently held that stacking of UM/UIM coverage did not apply to commercial fleet policies. Accordingly, the Court would not overturn existing court decisions without explicit direction from the Legislature.

Tim Rayne is the author of numerous publications on Personal Injury Law and is a graduate of the Temple University Beasley School of Law’s Master’s in Trial Advocacy Program. Tim can be reached at http://www.macelree.com/traynelaw.